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Walmart’s Sustainability Journey:  
Peter Redmond and the Search for Sustainable Seafood 
 
It was January 2006, and Peter Redmond, Walmart Vice President and Divisional Merchandise 
Manager of Deli and Seafood in Bentonville, Arkansas, pondered ways to develop a seafood 
business plan to support the company’s goal of selling sustainable products. Redmond had 
recently led an initiative to encourage Walmart’s foreign shrimp suppliers to adhere to Best 
Aquaculture Practices (BAP) standards. But this effort was a small part of a much bigger 
problem: Most of the world’s seafood was being fished to extinction. Walmart, the world’s 
largest seller of seafood, clearly was contributing to this situation. But what was its ultimate 
responsibility? What could be done to ensure that Walmart’s current customers and future 
generations had a sustainable supply of seafood? As CEO Lee Scott had said just three months 




Seeking Sustainable Seafood at Walmart 
 
At a June 2004 meeting, the CEO of the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Conservational 
International Peter Seligmann had presented Lee Scott with salmon purchased at a local 
Walmart. The sample was “a pound of salmon … 15 percent cheaper at Walmart than any other 
place, but the pink was a dye. And the farming practices to produce that salmon were just wiping 
out the coast of Chile because of the poor farming practices.”
ii
 Seligmann recalled that Scott 
responded with a recognition that his granddaughter was only two weeks old, and eliminating the 




an interview that “as you become a grandparent—I have a granddaughter—you just also become 




Redmond similarly recalled that early conversations about sustainability clearly reflected Scott’s 
concern for sustainable seafood: 
I will always remember that first meeting that I had with him on sustainability, 
and his comment that the color of money is always going to be green. And he laid 
that out in two ways. First, it’s just the right thing to do; but second it was a very 
savvy move because, if we align ourselves now correctly, five or ten years down 
the road, this will pay off from the business point of view. Our corporate footprint 
was a big one; so wherever we left it, he wanted to make sure that we left it a 
better place. 
 
So with that, he basically just laid out a very broad plan of what he wanted us to 
do and how the three goals [energy, waste and products] would be drawn up. And 
then within sustainable products, seafood emerged immediately for him as one of 
the major areas that he wanted to see improvement on quickly.  
 
With the support and direction of his CEO, Redmond began working with Seligmann and his 
team at Conservation International to expand the conversation about sustainable seafood and 
determine a path forward. 
 
In October 2005, following a year of intense listening and experimentation, Scott publicly 
announced a new sustainability vision for Walmart. Because of Walmart’s size and scope, Scott 
told listeners, the company was uniquely positioned to have a positive impact on the world. He 
proclaimed three sustainability goals: (1) to be supplied 100% by renewable energy, (2) to create 
zero waste, and (3) to sell products that sustain the world’s resources and environment. Scott also 
acknowledged, “These goals are both ambitious and aspirational, and I’m not sure how to 
achieve them ... at least not yet.”
iv
 Not surprisingly, public reaction was mixed, but overall, the 
response was best summed up in the words of Lee Scott himself: “We will not be measured by 




Andy Ruben, Vice President of Strategy and Sustainability, was the person charged with making 
sure that Scott’s vision became action and then results. Using some early successes in Walmart’s 
sustainability program as a foundation, Ruben came to realize the importance of employing a 




external stakeholders to garner valuable insights, and creating an atmosphere in which 
sustainability could be engrained in the corporate culture.
vi
 But Redmond also recalled the 
difficulty of the task: 
Andy had one of the hardest jobs of anyone because he had to take Lee's vision 
and translate that vision into a natural working prototype that you could use to 
convince the business units. In companies, usually the top says it, but the bottom 
does it. And it was Andy's job, especially in a role that had never been done 




The prototypes Ruben had in mind featured 14 Sustainable Value Networks that would be 
responsible for identifying opportunities and implementing changes to meet the environmental 
goals that Scott had set forth. (See Exhibit 1.) Each network included Walmart associates and 
suppliers, along with external stakeholders such as academics, governmental organizations, and 
NGOs, including both environmental and research groups. (See Exhibit 2.) Ruben’s vision also 
involved making sustainability an integral part of Walmart’s culture, so the networks were led by 
captains—senior-level managers from Sam’s Club or Walmart. Instead of creating new positions 
to lead the sustainability initiatives, the network captains assumed their leadership role as an 
extension of their existing responsibilities. Through guidance in each network, Walmart aimed 
for measureable progress toward achieving its sustainability goals.  
 
The network structure also reflected an emerging realization: The retail giant needed to reach 
outside of its vast organization and seek the expertise of supply chain partners and other 
stakeholder groups to reach its goals. Initially, the network looked to members, stakeholders, and 
subject-matter experts to understand key issues and identify opportunities to achieve 
measureable progress. Redmond recalled how Walmart’s Seafood network coalesced, largely 
due to the retailer’s power as a convener:  
The Seafood network evolved: First we had Conservation International; then we 
had the Marine Stewardship Council; then we had the Global Aquaculture 
Alliance. Then we asked a couple of suppliers to get involved and we had 
someone from Walmart International. By the time we had officially decided on a 
network structure, we had about half of it in place. So we had NGOs, we had 
industry; we had just about everybody you could have involved in it.  
 
Now, if you put people from NGOs in a room and then you add an industry 
person in the room, they’re liable to just not talk to each other. But then if you add 
the backdrop of Walmart organizing the meeting, they tend to work together and 




business out of it. This is true for NGOs that normally don’t like to work with 
business. I can remember the person from Greenpeace being totally excited and 
saying, “I always thought I’d be at Walmart’s corporate office. I thought I’d be 
rappelling down the front of it with a banner.” This shows the power of 
Walmart’s approach: You create a bigger platform when you bring all of the 
stakeholders in to discuss what needs to be done. 
 
Members of the network would meet and examine the entire value chain for environmental 
impacts, then identify potential changes in the business practices that might lead to the 
sustainability goals. It was in one of these meetings, coordinated by the sustainability 
consultancy Blu Skye, Redmond (as network captain) and the seafood team became closely 
acquainted with the unique challenges associated with sustainable seafood. Estimates indicated 
that 75% of the world’s fish stock was depleted.
viii
 Dire predictions indicated that every species 
of wild seafood would collapse within 50 years due to climate change and overfishing.
ix
 Other 
reports revealed that the fishing industry itself was harmful to the environment, due to the large 
amount of fuel fishing boats used while searching for the dwindling stocks of fish.
x
 Aquaculture, 
or fish farming, helped supplement the supply, but it had its own set of sustainability problems. 
As the world population continued to grow and 2.8 billion people ate fish as their primary source 
of protein,
xi
 the situation seemed increasingly dire. This was startling news for Redmond, despite 
his knowledge that demand for seafood at Walmart had increased notably.  
 
From Vision to Action  
 
The nascent and growing Seafood network led by Redmond first tackled the problem of shrimp, 
the top seafood in the United States,
xii
 which accounted for 80 million pounds of Walmart’s 
“footprint.” Work in this area featured partnerships with the Global Aquaculture Alliance (GAA) 
and Aquaculture Certification Council, Inc. (ACC), designed to certify that international shrimp 
suppliers adhered to a set of standards for farm-raised products. Independent third parties served 
to verify that farming practices were consistent with common criteria, or Best Aquaculture 
Practices (BAP). The November 2005 announcement of Walmart’s adherence to this scheme was 
generally well received in the environmental community, especially because it integrated a 
multistakeholder network that included several NGOs. Yet some critics, including the Mangrove 
Alliance Project, complained that the standards lacked credibility because they were developed 
by the industry itself
xiii




This certification program involving Wal-Mart and the Global Aquaculture 
Alliance Is Not Endorsed by MAP.… This whole plan needs closer scrutiny and 
involvement by the local communities and NGOs working in the regions where 
shrimp farming is taking place. Not only is this type of certification plan dreamed 
up by the very industry it aims to benefit, but also this plan will further confuse 





For Redmond, this anticipated criticism failed to reflect the true progress made. He believed that 
Walmart’s demands had tightened the BAP standards, rather than making them less restrictive. 
According to the GAA, Walmart had asked Conservation International to examine the BAP 
program and recommend improvements before signing on, and the recommendations resulted in 
better defined protections for wetlands, more attention to fishmeal use, and greater transparency 
in the standards development process.
xv
 But still, he realized that some interest groups would 
find no solution acceptable, other than not selling seafood at all: 
So we knew that no matter how good these programs were, we would get a 
portion of people that would say, “Oh, yeah, well, they’re either doing this for 
cover, or they’re doing it and these are terrible schemes.”… When you look at the 
Mangrove Restoration Project,… their goal is to protect the localized 
communities and things like that. So I think the real answer for them would be not 
to farm in those areas. And so you’ve got that classic clash of developing world or 
emerging world versus first world. We, from a Walmart point of view, had to get 
product, and from their point of view just having a certification program wasn’t 
going be good enough; there were 300 or 400 criteria above and beyond that, and 
one of them was to stop farming. 
 
Although the BAP standard creation was driven by Walmart, other standards also existed for 
other types of seafood. Two Seafood network members, the World Wildlife Fund and 
Conservation International, were particularly interested in the Marine Stewardship Council’s 
(MSC) certification for wild-caught fish. The MSC was an international NGO that emerged from 
a joint effort by Unilever and the World Wildlife Fund in 1997 to develop a market-based 
labeling scheme for fisheries. The MSC standards for labeling were consistent with the United 
Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization’s Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, 
developed through a multistakeholder process. Its governance bodies—the Board of Trustees, 
Technical Advisory Board, and Stakeholder Council—included representatives from industry, 
environmental groups, and scientific communities, across various geographical regions.
xvi
 The 




third parties could use to provide certification. Finally, the MSC allowed its label to be placed on 
fish that came from the fisheries thus certified. 
 
But third-party certification regimes had problems too, including determining the best way to 
audit certifiers. In MSC’s case, deeper concerns entailed its very right to function as a 
governance mechanism. European governments argued that the MSC, a non-state entity, had no 
mandate or experience to govern common-pool resources, such as fish stocks. The certification 
program thus might represent a trade barrier. Operationally, the market-based system that 
required fisheries to pay for the cost of certification might encourage them to seek low cost/low 
quality certifiers. As more retailers required the MSC label, the MSC also would be pressured to 
supply the demanded amount of fish through its certification process, which would weaken the 
entire system. There were also problems with determining whether the MSC was having any 
actual impact on fisheries’ sustainability. Complicating factors specific to fisheries, including the 
migratory patterns of many fish stocks, made the assessment even more difficult. Finally, the 
MSC standards seemed to favor industries in developed countries, where slack resources were 




Assessing the Opportunity 
 
Redmond, as the Seafood network captain, contemplated what to do. Certification had emerged 
as the most prominent initiative in the value network,
xviii
 and any solution seemed likely to 
involve some third-party verification; otherwise, how could Walmart know about the long-term 
sustainability of the seafood it sourced? To Redmond, maintaining a consistent supply was the 
biggest challenge, especially considering the company’s growing seafood business. At the same 
time, he needed to avoid increasing the cost of seafood for consumers. Recalling Scott’s 
insistence on seafood as a priority, Redmond reflected: 
That was somewhat alarming for me because at that time my role was all about 
procuring. I had three buyers, but we had a lot complexity in our business. So now 
we had the added emphasis of doing that in a sustainable manner.… The buyers 





Although Walmart had considerable purchasing power, Redmond wondered what impact it could 
really make and to what extent it was Walmart’s responsibility to shape the future of this global 
common good—that is, of the world’s fish stock. 
 
Complicating the matter, some countries were unwilling to curb demand for endangered fish 
species. Other nations, especially less developed countries, were unable or poorly equipped to 
regulate fisheries. Even with Walmart’s unique size and market power, how could it make a 
difference where international pressure already had failed?  
 
And then in the end, would consumers care? At present, consumers in developed countries were 
the only ones calling for eco-labels, and they were confused by the labels they saw in stores. Nor 
were they the only ones: “Difficulties are raised by the number of certification programs, 





Redmond kept coming back to a foundational question: How much was enough? Third-party 
certification of sustainable practices certainly seemed like a reasonable response, but maybe 
Walmart should do even more. After all, certification would not solve the problem of sustainable 
supply. What was, and what should be, expected of a firm of Walmart’s vast size? Moreover, 
what ultimately could it realistically deliver? But Redmond also knew that some action was 






Exhibit 1: Sustainable Value Networks 
 
Source: Walmart Slide excerpted from presentation shown to merchants April 2007, courtesy of 
Walmart 
 
Exhibit 2: SVN Membership 
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